Adventures in Government History The Origins of War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten U-Boat Battles on Canada’s Shores by Roger Sarty
Canadian Military History
Volume 21 | Issue 1 Article 7
4-16-2015
Adventures in Government History The Origins of
War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten U-Boat
Battles on Canada’s Shores
Roger Sarty
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Roger Sarty () "Adventures in Government History The Origins of War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten U-Boat Battles on Canada’s
Shores," Canadian Military History: Vol. 21: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/7
64
The front page story in The Canadian Magazine by Peter Moon in February 1972 that did 































: Adventures in Government History The Origins of War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten U-Boat Battles on Canada’s Shores
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
65
Abstract: This memoir relates the 
author’s formative professional 
experience during the early 1980s 
when he researched the role of the 
Royal Canadian Air Force in the 
defence of the Gulf of St. Lawrence 
against German submarines during 
the Second World War. He undertook 
this work at the Directorate of History 
at National Defence Headquarters 
in Ottawa as a junior member of the 
team that assisted W.A.B. Douglas in 
the production of The Creation of a 
National Air Force, the second volume 
of the official history of the RCAF. The 
memoir explains the challenges of 
this pioneering research on the role 
of aircraft in anti-submarine warfare. 
That work provided the basis for 
further research on anti-submarine 
warfare for the directorate’s new 
official history of the Royal Canadian 
Navy, and inspired the author’s own 
recent book War in the St. Lawrence.
Most books are to some extent autobiographical. They trace 
an author’s intellectual journey. 
War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten 
U-Boat Battles on Canada’s Shores1 
is more autobiographical than 
many. The journey unfolded over a 
period of forty years, although with 
numerous and sometimes prolonged 
interruptions.
I first became aware of the battle 
with the U-boats in the St. Lawrence 
in 1972 when the investigative 
journalist Peter Moon published 
“The Second World War Battle 
We Lost At Home” in the Toronto 
Star’s Canadian Magazine.2 The piece 
was built on interviews with Rear-
Admiral Paul Hartwig, of West 
Germany’s navy. As a young officer 
he had commanded U-517, far and 
away the most successful of the 15 
German submarines that operated in 
the St. Lawrence during the Second 
World War. His U-boat destroyed 
nine of the 23 ships sunk by enemy 
action in the St. Lawrence. Hartwig’s 
skill and boldness did much to 
convince an alarmed Canadian public 
and discouraged Canadian military 
commanders that their country’s 
maritime forces had been decisively 
defeated.
When I began to study naval 
history later in the 1970s, I discovered 
that the Canadian navy’s own official 
histories, published in 1950 and 
1952, also classed the St. Lawrence 
operations as a defeat.3 Only later, 
when I joined official histories unit 
in the Department of National 
Defence, did I learn that the navy 
histories were incomplete. Still more 
incomplete – almost non-existent 
– were accounts of the maritime 
squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air 
Force that had played a critical role in 
supporting the navy, not least in the 
St. Lawrence. 
Only the Canadian Army’s 
Second World War histor ical 
program survived deep cuts in the 
defence budget in 1947-1948.4 By that 
time Dr. Gilbert N. Tucker, the naval 
historian, and his team had produced 
a fully researched volume on the 
navy’s ”Activities on Shore” covering 
such topics as shipbuilding, base 
development, and the recruitment 
and training of personnel, and the 
naval control of merchant shipping. 
Tucker refused to rush ahead with 
a planned volume on operations at 
sea, because his team did not yet 
have access to such essential sources 
as high level intelligence files and 
the captured records of the German 
navy. Tucker, in fact, resigned. The 
naval staff commissioned Joseph 
Schull, a well known popular writer 
who was serving as a uniformed 
public relations officer, to produce 
a book as quickly as possible on the 
basis of Canadian operational reports 
that had been gathered by the team 
during the war. This was the genesis 
of Schull’s The Far Distant Ships: An 
Official Account of Canadian Naval 
Operations in the Second World War.
The air  force,  by contrast , 
abandoned its planned volumes 
on the air force’s vast wartime 
organization in Canada, including 
Eastern Air Command. The latter, 
with its headquarters in Halifax, 
was the counterpart of the navy’s 
Atlantic Coast command, and 
was responsible for air operations 
in eastern Quebec, the Maritime 
Provinces and Newfoundland and as 
far out into the Atlantic as its patrol 
bombers could reach.
In 1965 the Department of 
National Defence combined the Army 
Historical Section with the small navy 
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and air force historical units to create 
the Directorate of History (since 
1998, the Directorate of History and 
Heritage). The department lured 
Colonel Charles P. Stacey, historian 
of the overseas army in 1941-1945 and 
head of the Army Historical Section 
until 1959, back from his new teaching 
career at the University of Toronto to 
set up the new organization. Stacey 
quickly established the production of 
a full scale history of the air force, the 
service whose program has suffered 
the greatest setbacks in the cuts of 
1947-8, as the directorate’s priority 
task.
Stacey, who found the 1960s 
v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t 
bureaucracy even more frustrating 
than his exasperating experiences in 
the 1950s, persuaded Sydney F. Wise 
to replace him as director of history in 
1966. Wise, a professor of Canadian 
history at Queen’s University, had co-
authored one of the most successful 
textbooks of military history, and 
served in the RCAF during the war. 
He had started his academic career 
by using his veteran benefits to do 
a BA in history at the University of 
Toronto after he was demobilized 
from wartime service; he had then 
done graduate work at Queen’s. The 
changeover from Stacey, who had 
been born in 1906, to Wise, born in 
1924, marked a passing of the baton 
from one generation to another.5 
The last of the military officers with 
potential for senior positions whom 
Stacey had mentored as historians 
during the war and the 1950s had 
retired or were about to. Stacey 
recognized the central qualification 
for the job was historical expertise, 
and for that reason urged that future 
directors should be academics with 
administrative experience, engaged 
as civil servants. 
In the system established by 
Stacey in the Army Historical Section 
and still in place in a somewhat 
modified form today, the historical 
team was coordinated and mentored 
by the ”senior historian.” That person 
was responsible for the preparation of 
drafts for the director’s revision or his 
approval if another of the historians 
was to be the author of record.
Wise,  in those days when 
academically trained mili tary 
historians were very rare birds indeed, 
recruited as his senior historian a still 
rarer bird – a military officer with 
academic history qualifications. 
W.A.B. Douglas, who was born in 
1929 in Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) and raised in England, 
had first come to Canada during 
the war as a child evacuee from the 
German bombing attacks on London. 
He returned to Canada, permanently 
as it turned out, shortly after the war 
when his widowed mother married 
a chaplain in the Canadian Army 
overseas. Douglas paid his way 
through an undergraduate degree 
at the University of Toronto by 
joining the University Naval Training 
Divisions, and then became a regular 
force officer. During a dull posting 
in Halifax, he enrolled at Dalhousie 
University to do an MA in history 
in his own time. His thesis was on 
the Royal Navy and Nova Scotia 
in the eighteenth century. During 
a subsequent posting in Kingston, 
he began a PhD, an expansion of 
his MA naval topic, under Wise’s 
direction at Queen’s. When Wise left 
the directorate for a professorship at 
Carleton University in 1973, Douglas 
retired from the armed forces to 
become director of history. By pure 
coincidence, the leadership of the 
directorate had thus passed from 
a former army officer to a former 
air force officer and then to a naval 
officer who had just got out of 
uniform.
Douglas, while working full 
time on the air force history, also 
pushed deeply into the history of 
the Canadian navy in the Second 
World War. The two were in fact 
complimentary. Douglas took on as 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Stacey during 
his Second World War appointment 
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lead author the volume of the air force 
history that dealt with the hitherto 
virtually unknown organizations 
and operations in Canada, 1919-1945. 
A central part of the story was the 
history of Eastern Air Command, 
especially its support to the navy in 
escorting convoys and hunting for 
enemy submarines in the western and 
central north Atlantic. (One grumpy 
staff historian grumbled that the early 
drafts of the Eastern Air Command 
chapters read like a naval history, 
with the occasional aircraft buzzing 
into the picture and then just as 
quickly buzzing out.) This work, in 
which German U-boat records and 
high level intelligence information 
– including new releases by Great 
Britain of ”Ultra Top Secret” files 
of decrypted German naval signals 
– proved of vital importance, and 
revealed the limitations of The Far 
Distant Ships. 
If the sturdily built, deep voiced 
Charles Stacey, with his square hands 
and clipped moustache, seemed the 
stereotypical army colonel, then the 
tall, athletic, swaggering Syd Wise 
was the embodiment of an air force 
pilot. Alec Douglas, as tall as Syd but 
slighter in build, courtly in manner 
with an accent Canadians call British 
and the British call mid-Atlantic, 
and a carefully swept thatch of hair 
that has never, ever been cut short 
in anything approaching army style, 
is every inch the naval officer. And 
through the 1970s he promoted the 
cause of Canadian naval history – 
then virtually a non subject in the 
universities and popular literature, 
and a low priority in the defence 
department. He gave papers at 
academic conferences, spoke to naval 
veterans’ groups, assisted interested 
university professors and students, 
and urged the defence department to 
approve a fresh operational history of 
the navy in the Second World War. I 
was hired as a civil service historian 
by the directorate in May 1981 in the 
first position that was to be assigned 
to the new naval project. 
Ogilvy Annex 
First-time visitors to the Directorate of History in the early 1980s 
were often wide-eyed or laughing. 
The wide-eyed - those suspicious 
of  the secret  workings of  the 
defence establishment - wondered 
at what was ”really” going on 
that had to be disguised by the 
incongruous facilities. Those who 
laughed sometimes referred to the 
opening sequence of the television 
comedy ”Get Smart,” in which 
agent Maxwell Smart goes into an 
apparently innocuous phone booth, 
dials, and drops through a trap door 
to ”CONTROL” headquarters, or 
the series ”Man from UNCLE” in 
which the international intelligence 
agency’s offices were hidden above 
a tailor shop. The directorate, from 
the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, 
was located on the third and fourth 
floors of the Ogilvy’s department 
store annex on the south-east corner 
of Besserer and Nicholas Streets in 
Ottawa. One entered the building 
through the large appliances and 
home wares departments and then 
got off the elevator on a floor that had 
the appearance of a movie set for a 
Second World War spy drama. The 
offices were around the outer walls 
behind wooden partitions that went 
only two-thirds of the way to the 
ceiling and had smoked glass for the 
top two or three feet. The vast central 
space, some thousands of square feet, 
was filled with bank after bank of tall 
olive-drab file cabinets. 
As the new kid, I got the old word 
processing technology, a high-bodied 
1920s typewriter. The more senior 
hands got 1950s era typewriters, with 
a special feature that set the margins 
automatically. Only the secretaries – 
and the director himself – had state-
of-the-art technology, IBM ”Selectric” 
typewriters, with built-in correction 
tape. Some said the people were 
also a quirky mix. I always think of 
Captain Dick Morrison, a helicopter 
pilot with an aviator’s handlebar 
moustache and a love of English 
literature. McGill University turned 
down his proposal to do a PhD 
thesis on scatology in Shakespeare’s 
English. He was philosophical about 
the rejection – ”Shitty subject,” he 
concluded. Then there was Dave 
Kealy, who had been a regular 
officer in the Royal Navy from the 
age of 13 in the early 30s, and had 
served in destroyers all through the 
Second World War before retiring 
and immigrating to Canada where 
W.A.B. Douglas, who has remained active 
in naval history since his retirement as 
director of history in 1994, shown here 
while lecturing in 2011.
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he ultimately joined the Naval 
Historical Section. He always had 
his watch set for Greenwich Mean 
Time, Royal Navy style. At my job 
interview there had a bit of upset 
when Norman Hillmer, the current 
senior historian, objected to Brereton 
(”Ben”) Greenhous, the former senior 
historian, clipping his finger nails 
while we talked. Alec Douglas, who 
chaired the interview, gave me a long 
suffering look and sighed. 
The incident was revealing of 
Ben and Norman. Ben, big and burly, 
was a native of Shropshire in the 
west of England, an area he liked 
to remind us whose location on the 
once violent Welsh borderlands had 
given its people a fighting (some 
said, thinking of Ben, cantankerous) 
spirit. Ben, who was a few years too 
young to have served in the Second 
World War, had done his compulsory 
national military service during the 
late 1940s as a non-commissioned 
officer in British Army intelligence. 
He had then served as an officer in 
the Malayan police and seen combat 
during the communist insurgency 
during the 1950s. Subsequently he 
hiked across Afghanistan before 
permanently emigrating from 
England. His plan had been to go 
to New Zealand, but he fetched 
up in Ottawa. Carleton University 
welcomed him as a student, and 
he discovered his gift for historical 
research and writing.6 Norman 
Hillmer, by contrast, hailed from 
North Toronto. His father had been 
a senior official in the Toronto Board 
of Education, and Norman had 
embarked on a teaching career in the 
public school system before he did his 
PhD at Cambridge. He prided himself 
on his athletic physique and in 
summer often appeared at the office 
in tennis shorts and a suitably trendy 
polo shirt. When he announced that 
he had bought a Toyota Camry – then 
a little known new model – someone 
wondered aloud ”But what car do 
Yuppies drive?” Alec immediately 
replied, ”Well now it’s a Camry.” 
Norman took perverse delight in 
his unmilitary background – so 
much so that I only later came fully 
to appreciate the extent to which 
his historical career had blossomed 
when, in the 1960s, he was a student 
of Charles Stacey’s at the University 
of Toronto. He had in fact done his 
MA research, on Sir Robert Borden’s 
naval policy, under Stacey’s direction. 
Norman, an historian of international 
relations, downplayed this and 
his other notable achievements 
in military scholarship. During 
a staff seminar to review a draft 
chapter of the air force history, the 
question came up whether some 
material would be accessible to 
someone with no specialized military 
knowledge. Spontaneously we all 
turned to Norman – who beamed at 
the acknowledgement, and allowed, 
yes he understood the draft perfectly 
well. Norman and Ben, both masters 
of English style, ran something like 
a continuous writing seminar for the 
more junior staff, patiently annotating 
draft after draft – and suggesting yet 
another draft might finally achieve 
something approaching clarity and 
precision. 
Although I was hired for the 
future naval history, the volume 
on the air force in Canada, 1919-45, 
had priority. As part of my training 
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of Eastern Air Command in the 
battle of the St. Lawrence. It seemed 
a good way to get my feet wet 
without drowning. Alec and Dave 
Kealy had spent considerable time 
building analytical accounts7 from the 
extremely preliminary chronological 
”narrative” on the history of Eastern 
Air Command that had been prepared 
by the original air force historical 
team during and immediately after 
the war.8 Alec and Dave had their 
hands more than full with the largest 
and most important story: the role of 
Eastern Air Command in the main 
theatre of the Battle of the Atlantic, 
the sea routes between the major 
US and Canadian east coast ports 
and Great Britain. The material they 
had encountered on the air force’s 
role in the gulf suggested that the 
air force, like the navy, had given 
the gulf a distant second priority 
after the defence of the transatlantic 
convoys that sustained Britain and 
built up the resources needed for 
the liberation of Europe in 1943-5. In 
fact, the role of the air force in the St. 
Lawrence seemed so limited that my 
assignment was to produce a research 
paper of no more than 30 double-
spaced typed pages; I was to give 
the project half time for about three 
months. This was the beginning of an 
ever growing enterprise that would 
continue for some five years, and in 
the later stages, as we prepared the 
air force volume for press, become 
something more than a full-time 
commitment.
Almost immediately the subject 
took on a life of its own. It was indeed 
true that the air force had played a 
supporting role to the navy in the 
St. Lawrence. The navy, however, 
relied upon aircraft as the principal 
means for reinforcing the thinly-
stretched warship escorts for gulf 
shipping, and more particularly for 
searching out the submarines and 
striking back at them while the few 
warships available ”held the goal 
posts” close around the merchant 
ship convoys. During 1942, when 
U-boats first attacked in the gulf, it 
became a leading commitment for 
Eastern Air Command, absorbing 40 
percent and more of the command’s 
flying effort despite its primary tasks 
in the protection of Atlantic convoys. 
Developments in the gulf confronted 
both the air force and navy leadership 
with the need more fully to integrate 
their services’ efforts, and the St. 
Lawrence became something of a 
laboratory for the development of 
more effective cooperation between 
warships and aircraft  in anti-
submarine warfare. 
In retrospect it is easy to say 
”we should have known” about the 
scale and importance of the air effort 
in the gulf. Peter Moon’s account 
of Paul Hartwig’s 1942 mission in 
The Canadian Magazine recounted 
Hartwig’s memories – since fully 
confirmed by German documents 
– about how his U-boat had been 
relent less ly  hunted by RCAF 
bombers, and very nearly destroyed. 
Moon’s emphasis on Hartwig’s 
success tended to downplay the air 
force’s response, however. Writers 
and readers in the 1970s were by 
no means alone in this emphasis. 
In the 1980s I found the report of 
Hartwig’s interrogation by British 
intelligence officers when he was 
captured following the destruction of 
his submarine by British forces in the 
eastern Atlantic in November 1942. 
The reaction of Canadian staff officers 
when they received this report early 
in 1943 was a sense of frustration and 
failure because the numerous attacks 
on Hartwig’s boat had not destroyed 
it, or even broken the fighting spirit 
of the crew.9 
What was missing in the 1970s, 
and of course in 1942-3, was context 
that could only come from German 
records and close co-relation of 
the information they contained 
with the most detailed reports 
available on Canadian air and naval 
operations. The salient point that 
emerged from that analysis was that 
Eastern Air Command reinforced and 
reorganized its effort in response to 
the initial run of success by U-517 
and its consort, U-165, in late August 
and early September 1942. U-165, 
having exhausted its complement 
of torpedoes, headed for home on 
16 September – and warned U-boat 
headquarters about the effective air 
cover.10 U-517, by contrast, was only 
half way through its six-week mission, 
but was unable, despite repeated 
and aggressive efforts, to make any 
further successful attacks. More 
than that, Eastern Air Command’s 
new methods were instrumental in 
greatly limiting the success of three 
other submarines that immediately 
followed Hartwig into the gulf to 
the destruction of a total of only 
three ships, and persuaded a fourth 
U-boat not even to attempt to enter. 
Tragically, one of the three ships 
lost was the Newfoundland Railway 
ferry Caribou, destroyed by U-69 
on the night of 13-14 October 1942, 
while the passenger ship was making 
its regular crossing of the Cabot 
Strait between North Sydney, Cape 
Breton Island and Port-aux-Basques, 
Newfoundland. This disaster, in 
which 136 people perished, many of 
them women and children, confirmed 
for the public, the military and the 
government that the defence of the 
St. Lawrence was a failure. German 
records, however, added a vital 
additional element. U-69 had in fact 
been driven from the St. Lawrence by 
Eastern Air Command’s effective air 
patrols, and was lurking in the Cabot 
Strait so she could quickly escape into 
the safety of the open ocean. 
More generally, it was not until 
Canadian and other researchers 
began to re-examine the whole 
history of maritime air power in the 
Second World War in the late 1970s 
and 1980s that two crucial elements 
of broader context became apparent. 
The first was the enormous technical 
difficulties encountered by Britain, 
then the leading maritime air power, 
and the United States air forces in 
aerial anti-submarine operations. 
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No air force was dependably able 
to destroy submarines until the 
latter part of 1942, and Eastern Air 
Command did as well as the larger 
Allied air forces. Second, it was only 
this fresh analysis of the larger Allied 
effort that established the special 
difficulties that Eastern Air Command 
faced. It was well behind the other 
Allied air forces in both modern 
equipment and trained personnel, the 
result of the Canadian air force – and 
the Canadian government – giving 
absolute priority to the recruitment 
and training of tens of thousands of 
personnel for the Royal Air Force’s 
combat commands in Britain.
Still, how could Canada’s large 
air effort in the gulf, one of the big 
stories of the war on Canada’s shores, 
slip into such obscurity? One reason 
is that no one looked. When the RCAF 
official history program went on the 
chopping block in the late 1940s, 
the only reasonably full account of 
Eastern Air Command was a very 
preliminary chronology assembled 
by a member of the wartime historical 
section to provide a basic reference 
for the authors of the official history 
volumes that were never written. 
The chronology, some 900 pages of 
legal-sized typescript pages in length, 
organizes each of the wartime years 
into four chapters, each covering a 
three-month period. The quarterly 
chapters in turn comprise sections 
on each of the command’s bases and 
the squadrons at those bases. Most 
of the material is a ”scissors and 
paste” compilation of extracts from 
the daily diaries kept by these units. 
These diaries vary widely in content 
and quality, depending entirely 
upon how the officer assigned the 
task chose to fill in the forms. Some 
provided only a line on the weather 
conditions, and a bare-bones listing 
of the aircraft that flew. Others, 
who took the job more seriously, 
included notes on personnel posted 
or departing, training programs, 
digests of intelligence received on 
enemy operations, information on 
the purpose and results of each 
aircraft mission, and sometimes 
annexed copies of important orders 
and reports. 
The greatest challenge in grasping 
the main threads from the diffuse 
chronological history derives from 
the very nature of air operations, 
and, in particular, air operations on 
Canada’s east coast. The navy rather 
than the air force determined the 
shape of the maritime air campaign. 
It was the navy that controlled the 
merchant shipping that the enemy 




















An RCAF Consolidated Canso or Catalina flying boat from the after deck of a Fairmile motor launch showing its depth charge 
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middle part of their passage where the narrow waters of the estuary allowed U-boats most readily to locate and attack shipping.
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the navy that gathered and analyzed 
intelligence about enemy threats. 
On that basis, it was the navy that 
planned and controlled operations. 
The navy’s fundamental defence 
measure for friendly shipping was 
to collect vessels together into 
convoys. Merchant ships sailing 
singly provided a string of vulnerable 
targets to the enemy. Submarines 
could hunt one ship and then another 
without fear of retribution. Even 
if the victim managed to radio for 
help, aircraft and warships usually 
could not reach the scene for at least 
an hour or more, ample time for 
the submarine quickly to run from 
the area, dive and wait till the coast 
was clear, once again free to seek 
out another target. If those same 
merchant ships were sailed together 
in a convoy, then escort warships 
and aircraft could be concentrated 
around that convoy. In order to 
sink merchant ships in convoy, 
the enemy submarines had to face 
those defending forces. The primary 
defence of a convoy was the group 
of warships that provided the ”close 
escort.” These vessels remained 
constantly with the convoy, day and 
night and in all weathers. The most 
senior warship commander, the 
”senior officer of the escort” directed 
all defence operations, including 
missions by aircraft dispatched by 
headquarters on shore to assist the 
convoy.
One of the greatest virtues 
of aircraft, their rapid mobility, 
also makes historical analysis of 
operations difficult. In the early 
1940s a single squadron of ten or 
15 aircraft could simultaneously 
undertake different missions in 
widely separated areas hundreds 
of miles from the squadron’s home 
base. A single convoy, or a particular 
area where intelligence suggested a 
submarine might be lurking, might 
receive coverage by aircraft from 
two or more squadrons from two 
or more bases on a single day. If 
need be, aircraft from squadrons at 
the larger bases could within hours 
fly to another station closer to the 
scene for detached operations that 
might continue for days or weeks, 
depending on enemy activity. In 
other words, a single air squadron, 
in contrast to army units and naval 
escort groups, was seldom assigned 
to carry out a complete operation of 
several days’ or weeks’ duration. It 
is often necessary to sift through the 
records of many squadrons with an 
eagle eye in order to discover among 
the scores or even hundreds of flights 
recorded (often in incomplete form) 
the air missions that supported a 
particular convoy. Moreover, to make 
any real sense of the air missions – 
why they were ordered and what 
they were expected to accomplish – it 
is necessary to track down the full 
naval records of that convoy.
There were, as it turned out, 
special opportunities, but equally 
frustrating obstacles, in carrying 
out this kind of research in the early 
1980s. Incredible as it may seem, there 
was no published model of what the 
history of an air command engaged 
in the Battle of the Atlantic might 
look like. The British official history, 
The War at Sea, four fat volumes 
produced by Captain S.W. Roskill 
in 1954-61, told the stories of all the 
armed services engaged. As a result 
the treatment of the RAF's Coastal 
Command is merged in with the more 
extensive account of the Royal Navy’s 
predominant role. The American 
published histories similarly do not 
give a focussed, detailed account 
but for different reasons. There was 
no separate American air force. The 
army and navy each had their own 
aviation branches, and maritime air 
operations receive brief treatment 
in the service histories. The Army 
Air Forces did produce their own 
six-volume official history, but, in 
the fall of 1942, the army turned 
its responsibility for shore-based 
maritime aviation over to the navy. 
Fortunately, the British did 
produce a typescript history, ”The 
R.A.F. in Maritime War,” for the 
internal use of the military staffs and 
as a supporting study for Captain 
Roskill’s published official history. 
More fortunately still, ”The R.A.F. 
in Maritime War” had been released 
to the archives in the 1970s. This 
massive, fully referenced study 
became one of the models for the 
Eastern Air Command chapters 
of the new RCAF official history. 
Significantly in light of the fact 
that the British, the pioneers in 
maritime aviation, had discovered 
that maritime air forces could only be 
effective if they operated under naval 
control, the author was Captain D.V. 
Peyton Ward, RN, the naval liaison 
officer to the RAF Coastal Command 
during the war.11 
 Peyton Ward’s work confirmed 
what the Canadian official historians 
had already discovered in writing 
the first volume of the RCAF official 
history in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
on the role of Canadian airmen in 
the British flying services during 
the First World War.12 (Syd Wise 
was the senior author, and Alec 
Douglas undertook the work on 
maritime aviation.) Squadron and 
base records of the sort used for the 
Eastern Air Command narrative 
were useful mainly for specific 
detail. The information that would 
tell a coherent story could only be 
obtained in the records of major 
regional commands, and the national 
armed services ministries. These 
senior headquarters set policy and 
coordinated action for everything 
from the recruitment and training 
of personnel, to the acquisition of 
aircraft and other equipment, to the 
construction of base facilities, and 
development of tactical methods.
Some may imagine government 
records management in terms of 
lavish facilities that embody the 
commitment to preserve the saga 
of the nation. While it is true that 
governments devote more effort 
to records management than by 
almost any other agency, the effort 
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is never equal to the challenge, and 
impressive only in comparison to the 
neglect of records in most places at 
most times. People are far too busy 
with the consuming pressures of 
day to day life to give much thought 
to records; all too often at work, as 
at home, we tend to stuff old letters 
or invoices that have been paid into 
drawers or boxes in no particular 
order, and then chuck things out 
when the drawers begin to jam or the 
attic is chock-a-block. Much historical 
research, especially into areas that 
have been little studied – the research 
that is the most fun – bears a closer 
resemblance to the annual panic 
to find income tax receipts amidst 
the detritus at the bottom of the 
briefcase and in various kitchen 
drawers than to the caricature of the 
tweedy academic calmly perusing 
well ordered tomes. The neat thing 
about the Directorate of History in 
the early 1980s was that its row on 
row of musty cabinets created the 
atmosphere of a mystery-filled attic 
in a 1940s film-noir, while it truly did 
represent – and does so today with its 
updated archival shelving and acid-
free documents boxes – management 
of paper records that is about as good 
as it gets.
The Eastern Air Command 
files that survived were all at the 
Directorate of History, in the banks 
of olive drab cabinets. These files 
are excellent, but selective and 
incomplete. The members of the 
original air force team that had 
arranged for their retention in the 
1940s apparently chose only the 
most obviously significant items, 
attempting in the interest of economy 
to avoid excessive duplication by 
relying upon the files of Air Force 
Headquarters (AFHQ) in Ottawa as 
the primary record. Most the AFHQ 
files had been accessioned by the 
Public Archives (now Library and 
Archives Canada), meaning that they 
could be ordered from the archives 
reading room on Wellington Street, 
and delivered there within a matter 
of hours. The finding aids, excellent 
for the early 1980s, consisted of type-
written or handwritten lists, arranged 
according to the original numbering 
of the files, and giving the title of 
the file. The lists run to hundreds of 
pages, and the only search engine 
was ”by finger” – going through the 
lists page by page, entry by entry, and 
manually noting those of potential 
interest. As in any file system, the 
file titles capture the contents with 
greatly varying degrees of accuracy, 
and it was therefore essential to err 
on the side of caution by calling up 
any item whose title suggested the 
faintest link with the research subject. 
There were significant gaps in 
coverage by the files at the archives. 
Some of the missing items turned 
up in the Federal Records Centre, a 
warehouse at the Tunney’s Pasture 
complex of federal government 
buildings in the west end of Ottawa 
where files that might still have 
information required for ongoing 
issues were stored under the 
physical charge of the archives, 
while remaining the property of 
the department that created them. 
Still others finally came to light in 
the file storage of the department 
under new numbers. Their subjects, 
such as a key file on the overall air 
defence of Canada, had a continuing 
relevance for policy, and therefore 
they had been renumbered according 
to recent filing systems. The files still 
under the department’s control, at 
the Federal Record Centre and in 
the department’s own storage, often 
proved the most difficult to find. 
There were no inventory lists, like 
those created by the Public Archives 
for the records it accessioned, and the 
only finding aids were the original 
index cards used by the contemporary 
records managers. Many of the cards 
consisted of scribbled notations 
used by clerks in filing incoming 
correspondence, and there were 
only one or two older members of 
the records management staff whose 
experience reached back far enough 
for them to be able, with considerable 
effort, to correlate the information on 
the cards to file storage locations. In 
the case of the main AFHQ subject 
file on the defence of the Gulf of 

















U-517 crash dives as seen from Flying 
Officer Maurice Belanger’s Lockheed 
Hudson during its attack run on 29 
September 1942. The Gaspé coast is in 
the background.
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down the original file control card, 
only to discover that the file had been 
reported missing sometime in the 
1950s. It never did surface.
Because  the  mar i t ime  a i r 
operations supported the navy, and 
the navy’s published operational 
history was based on research that was 
incomplete, there had to be extensive 
work in navy records as well. The 
extended chronological narrative on 
the Battle of the Atlantic that wartime 
naval historical officers had written, 
and Joseph Schull had used for The 
Far Distant Ships, has some of the 
same strengths and weaknesses as 
the Eastern Air Command narrative. 
It is less discursive than the air force 
chronology because of the navy’s 
directing role in maritime operations 
that made salient events stand out 
more clearly. The historical officers 
were thus able to trim a good deal of 
detail about administrative matters 
and routine operations, the sort 
of bits and pieces that even while 
obscuring the main elements of the 
Eastern Air Command story provide 
insight into daily life and work-a-day 
problems at the command’s bases.
The records of commanding 
officer Atlantic Coast (COAC), the 
regional navy command at Halifax 
that corresponded to Eastern Air 
Command, are voluminous. They 
had been saved in a nick of time by 
the Naval Historical Section in the 
mid-1960s when cutbacks that closed 
down the warehouses where they 
were stored had initially brought a 
program of wholesale destruction. 
In 1981 these files were just being 
accessioned by the archives and 
their structure and contents were 
largely unknown. Very large blocks 
of wartime files from Naval Service 
Headquarters (NSHQ) had been kept 
open and in use to the early 1960s, 
and these in the early 1980s were 
in the midst of transfer from DND 
and the Federal Records Centre to 
the archives. Even more than in the 
case of the Air Force Headquarters 
records, a good deal of time was 
required to discover which files 
still existed and what their general 
contents were.
Alec had three special interests 
for the Eastern Air Command 
chapters. What was the German side 
of the story, and in particular how 
effective or ineffective were Canadian 
operat ions  f rom the  German 
perspective? What intelligence was 
available to the Canadian forces and 
how did this information influence 
operations? Finally, what advanced 
technology did the Canadian forces 
possess, especially aircraft mounted 
anti-submarine radar in the case of 
Eastern Air Command, and how did 
it contribute to Canadian operations? 
These were the main elements 
missing from The Far Distant Ships, 
and for some years had been the basis 
of Alec’s own research.
Faced with a subject I knew little 
about, and a mass of records that 
were entirely new to me, I searched 
for some sort of point of entry, some 
method of identifying what was 
important. The objective of Eastern 
Air Command’s operations in the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence was to prevent 
the U-boats from attacking shipping. 
The key task, therefore, was to 
find out precisely what impact the 
command’s operations had on the 
enemy, and thus the essential first 
source was the German records. 
This approach focussed the seven 
month campaign in 1942, from May 
through November, to 22 events: the 
12 occasions on which the submarines 
had successfully attacked shipping, 
and the ten occasions on which 
aircraft had made attacks in which 
there was good reason to conclude 
the target had been a U-boat, and not 
one of the many – countless – false 
contacts resulting from the large 
amounts of flotsam on the surface of 
the water in the gulf, and the frequent 
fogs and mists. These 22 events were 
a much more manageable research 
agenda than the hundreds of often 
poorly recorded flights Canadian 
aircraft had made in the gulf in 
support of over a hundred merchant 
ship convoys, whose records were 
also incomplete in many instances.
By the early 1980s we knew the 
identity of most of the U-boats that 
had operated in the gulf (those other 
than the famous U-517) and when 




















U-165 under attack on 9 September 
1942 by a Lockheed Hudson of 113 
Squadron, piloted by Pilot Officer Robert 
S. Keetley.
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work by Professor-Doctor Jürgen 
Rohwer, director of the Library of 
Contemporary History in Stuttgart, 
Germany. Rohwer was a junior 
officer in the German navy during 
the war. He served in minesweepers, 
and as Allied ground forces closed 
in on his ship’s base in the spring of 
1945 he joined a group of seamen who 
organized themselves as an infantry 
unit and took to the countryside to 
fight the invaders. He had never 
surrendered to the enemy, bearing 
arms until the government of Hitler’s 
successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz, 
capitulated. In his subsequent 
academic career he became one of 
the first non-government scholars 
to analyze the large body of U-boat 
records that survived the war. One of 
his projects was to correlate U-boat 
attack records with Allied shipping 
records to determine precisely which 
ships had been under attack, which 
attacks had been effective, and those 
that had missed.13 Rohwer was in 
correspondence with the Canadian 
Naval Historical Section in the early 
1960s for assistance with his work on 
U-boat attacks in Canadian waters, 
and on transatlantic convoys that had 
been under Canadian escort. At the 
same time, he assisted the Canadian 
historians by helping to identify the 
U-boats that had been the target of 
attacks by Canadian forces. 
Taking these 22 instances of 
confirmed contact with U-boats, I 
was able to push into the Canadian 
air and naval records with a series 
of questions. In the case of U-boat 
attacks on shipping, had there 
been an aircraft in the vicinity? If 
so, aircraft from which squadron, 
from what base, and what was the 
aircraft’s mission? If the aircraft 
was operating on detached duty 
at a base within the gulf, when 
had that special detachment been 
established and why? If no aircraft 
was present why was that the case? 
Had air protection been ordered, and 
if so why had it not been provided? 
What was the response of Canadian 
naval and air forces to the submarine 
attack? What reinforcements came, 
from what bases and with what 
orders? In the case of air attacks on 
U-boats, the questions were similar, 
but with additional ones about how 
the aircraft had located the U-boat. 
Did the aircraft have intelligence 
that a U-boat was in the area? What 
was the source of that intelligence? 
Was the aircraft equipped with 
radar, and did this help in making 
contact with the submarine? The 
great challenge was in building up 
as full a picture as possible of air 
operations on the days of the crucial 
events, and, to give essential context 
about the command’s procedures and 
capabilities, on the days immediately 
preceding and following those events. 
It quickly became apparent that 
in 1942 Eastern Air Command was 
still in the early stages of expansion. 
When the first U-boat struck in the 
gulf in May 1942, the command 
had only four fully organized anti-
submarine squadrons equipped 
with modern aircraft; additional 
aircraft and aircrew were just arriving 
to re-equip a fifth squadron, and 
organize additional units. Even 
with the hastening of these efforts (a 
direct response to the appearance of 
submarines in the gulf as it turned 
out), the command was woefully 
short of aircraft and trained aircrew. 
For this reason, much of the flying 
in the gulf was done by aircraft 
sent for single missions from the 
main Atlantic coast bases, or special 
detachments of two or three bombing 
aircraft sent for a period of days or 
weeks to training airfields within 
the gulf or on the St. Lawrence River. 
Often the aircraft on detachment 
were rotated back to their home 
base for maintenance, and replaced 
by other aircraft, sometimes from 
the same squadron, sometimes from 
another unit.
T h i s  c o n s t a n t  s h u f f l e  o f 
i n d i v i d u a l  a i r c r a f t  o r  s m a l l 
detachments from many bases and 
squadrons in what were frequently 
emergency conditions following a 
U-boat attack explained why the 
story of Eastern Air Command’s 
role had for so long remained so 
obscure. There exists no consolidated 
source recording missions in the 
gulf and detachments to temporary 
bases in the gulf. Certainly there are 
valuable passages in the Eastern Air 
Command narrative history, and in 
the base and squadron diaries upon 
which the narrative was largely 
based, but these are buried in other 
material covering the whole range of 
the command’s activities. Even these 
passages are not necessarily complete 
or fully accurate. 
Without realizing it, I was getting 
a particularly clear lesson about 
one of the basic rules of research 
into military operations. The most 
dependable sources are signals 
exchanged by radio, or, in the case 
of headquarters by telegraph or 
teletype, by participants during the 
event. In the Canadian air force and 
navy these messages were typed by 
communications staff at the various 
headquarters onto pink forms some 
six to eight inches in length and eight 
inches wide with the originator and 
recipients at the top. Right after the 
text was the precise time (to the 
minute) and date the originator sent 
the message, which served as its 
reference number. At the bottom of 
the form were one or two time-date 
groups which indicated when the 
addressee received the message, 
and, if it was in cypher, when it 
was decyphered. The advantage of 
the messages as a source is that by 
definition they record precisely what 
was known by participants during 
the course of the events. A squadron 
or base war diary might well have 
been written up days after the event 
by an officer who may not have been 
privy to all the details; even if he had 
been, his account would inevitably 
be coloured by his knowledge about 
how things turned out, and by the 
practical need to select and condense 
material for the written account. The 
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principles of research into military 
operations are thus virtually identical 
to those of police investigations or 
legal proceedings: the best evidence 
is that directly from participants 
gathered as close to the event as 
possible.
The first important breakthrough 
in the project was the discovery that 
Eastern Air Command (EAC) sent 
a daily signal of several pages in 
length to the Air Ministry in Britain 
and AFHQ, listing all missions 
flown that day, missions ordered 
that had been cancelled or curtailed 
by weather or equipment defects, 
and, a list of missions ordered 
for the following day. The latter 
was of particular importance for 
it gave a fair indication where the 
command suspected U-boats were 
operating, and thus what intelligence 
was available. No single complete 
collection of these signals exists, but 
a reasonably full run can be pieced 
together from various dockets that 
survive in the AFHQ records at the 
archives and in EAC records at the 
Directorate of History. Some dockets, 
however, report areas patrolled in a 
letter code for which a key no longer 
exists, making it impossible to discern 
which flights were in the gulf. In these 
cases, the better squadron diaries 
and weekly and monthly reports 
helped fill in the information. In all 
cases, the signals reported flights by 
squadron, not mission, so there was 
no alterative but to go through each 
page, line by line, to identify missions 
over the gulf. 
The main work for my initial 
gulf report was to build a list of all 
missions in the gulf, for the periods in 
which there were confirmed contacts 
with the U-boats. For each mission 
listed, I endeavoured to identify the 
aircraft, its squadron, the base it was 
operating from, the time it took off, 
the time it landed, and geographical 
area the patrol covered, and, course, 
as much information as I could find 
on any special occurrence during 
the flight, particularly an actual or 
possible sighting of a U-boat. 
Naval records, the essential 
context for the air missions, also had 
to be stitched together from many 
places. Naval Service Headquarters 
maintained master files of convoy 
reports, but as a space saving measure 
these were microfilmed in the early 
1950s and the originals destroyed. 
Few of the files are complete. There 
were many series of coastal convoys 
in Canadian waters, on the Atlantic 
coast as well as in the gulf, most 
of which were established as an 
emergency response to U-boat attacks 
so arrangements, including record 
keeping, were necessarily improvised 
and informal. Many of the signals 
were barely legible file copies, and 
are unreadable on the microfilm. 
Fortunately, the Naval Historical 
Section saved two filing cabinets of 
signals held by the Trade Division 
of NSHQ, the office of the naval staff 
that oversaw the organization of all 
convoys. Again, the quality of the 
file copies is poor, but most can be 
deciphered. At the archives some 
reports missing from the microfilms 
turned up in scattered files in the 
COAC collection.
The greatest pleasure of the 
work, aside from the excitement of 
new discoveries, was the collegial 
atmosphere. A group of six or seven 
historians would gather for coffee 
breaks and brown-bag lunches to 
share findings and frustrations. 
Regular participants who mentored 
my efforts included M.V. ”Vince” 
Bezeau (who was working on 
Western Air Command), Carl Christie 
(Ferry Command, and operations 
from Newfoundland), Owen Cooke 
(archivist), Ben Greenhous (British 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan), 
and Steve Harris (air force policy).14 
The spirit of collaboration also came 
from the bosses, Norman Hillmer 
who supervised the research and 
was the overall editor of the volume, 
and Alec Douglas, the senior author, 
who received our edited reports from 
Norman. The whole team, with Alec 
in the chair, met in seminar to review 
newly completed reports, and Alec 
and Norman closely consulted the 
authors of reports about how their 
work was being trimmed and shaped 
for the final chapters. 
Far from telling me to wrap 
things up, Alec and Norman asked 
me to pursue leads. In the end, my 
report on Eastern Air Command in 
the St. Lawrence in 1942 took over a 
year of part-time work to complete, 
and filled 117 typescript pages. Nor 
was that the end of it. The final 
section of the report detailed how 
the dramatic sinking of ships close 
to Canadian soil had created such 
alarm among the population, and 
consternation for the military and the 
government, that the development 
of more effective defences for the 
gulf became a top priority for the 
1943 shipping season. There was 
little German activity in Canadian 
waters that year, and indeed the 
main story was how Eastern Air 
Command extended its operations far 
into the central and eastern Atlantic 
successfully to engage U-boats in 
some of the most important convoy 
battles of the war. During 1944, 
however, the U-boats returned in 
strength to Canadian waters. They 
achieved far fewer sinkings than in 
1942, but they continued to destroy 
warships and merchant ships right 
up until the last weeks of the war. 
Two of the most dramatic submarine 
attacks were again in the gulf: severe 
damage to the frigate HMCS Magog 
by U-1223 on 14 October 1944, and 
the destruction of the corvette HMCS 
Shawinigan with the loss of all 91 
members of her crew by U-1228 on 
the night of 23-24 November 1944.
Alec asked me to carry on with 
the gulf story in 1943-5. It did not 
look like a promising subject. During 
the period August to December 
1944 when the U-boats renewed the 
offensive in the St. Lawrence, aircraft 
did not make a single confirmed 
sighting of a submarine, let alone an 
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attack. Yet, aircraft were extremely 
active in the gulf. In an effort to 
relate this flying effort to the U-boat 
patrols, I plotted the areas covered 
by the aircraft each day against the 
tracks of the submarines. Work in 
the German records to produce these 
plots soon showed why the aircraft 
made no contacts. So great was the 
threat from land-based aviation that 
submarines ran almost continuously 
submerged when in North American 
coastal waters during the latter part 
of 1944 and early 1945. Because of 
well-founded fears that Allied radio 
direction-finding stations could 
locate the source of transmissions 
and quickly home aircraft to the 
position, the Germans operated in 
radio silence. While U-boats were 
still crossing the central ocean they 
exchanged signals with headquarters 
to receive their orders for North 
American coastal operations, and 
the submarines rarely signalled 
again until they had completed their 
mission and withdrawn back out 
into the central ocean. As a result 
the actual daily positions in the 
U-boat logs are in many cases quite 
different from the estimated positions 
shown in the diary kept at U-boat 
headquarters, which often had no 
word of a submarine’s progress for 
several weeks. 
In the Canadian records there 
were two exciting finds. In the 
summer of 1943 the newly expanded 
Operational Intelligence Centre at 
Naval Service Headquarters began 
to issue to the east coast commands 
a high classified daily signal code-
named ”Otter.” It listed U-boats 
operating in the western Atlantic, 
and the areas where each might be 
patrolling for the next 24 hours. The 
daily operations reports signals from 
Eastern Air Command showed that 
the missions ordered for air patrols 
were to cover the areas identified in 
the Otter signals. Most strikingly, 
for many days the estimated U-boat 
positions given in the Otter signals 
corresponded to the estimated 
positions in the U-boat headquarters 
diary. We knew from the early 
releases by the British archives of 
material on Ultra intelligence that 
after the blackout through much of 
1942, the British had managed to 
break into U-boat radio traffic once 
more, and, with American assistance, 
were subsequently able to decrypt 
many signals within a matter of a 
few hours. Could it be that Naval 
Service Headquarters in Ottawa 
was receiving Ultra intelligence, 
and this was the basis of the Otter 
signals? There were a few instances 
in the Otter signals that provided 
more definite clues. Normally the 
Otter signals were dispatched in the 
evening to allow east coast staffs time 
to plan and order missions for the next 
day. On a few occasions special Otter 
signals went out at other times of the 
day with an urgent amendment to 
one of the estimated U-boat positions 
dispatched the previous evening. On 
checking the German sources I found 
that on several of these occasions 
U-boat headquarters had sent new 
instructions to U-boats already on 
patrol in North American waters. 
The timing of these signals was 
only hours before a corresponding 
special Otter signal. Alec, who in 
joint projects with Jürgen Rohwer 
had undertaken some of the first 
detailed academic work on the role 
of Ultra intelligence in the battle of 
the Atlantic, knew the British sources 
thoroughly. Fortunately, decrypts 
of U-boat signals for the latter part 
of the war had just been released 
to the archives. Alec took the list 
of the special Otter signals to the 
UK archives, and discovered that 
in each case the British had indeed 
promptly decrypted the U-boat 
headquarters tasking signals we had 
located in the German records. These 
discoveries left no doubt that Ottawa 
was immediately receiving the latest 
Ultra decrypts and quickly analyzing 
them for the direction of Canadian 
operations. 
The basic research on 1943-5 
revealed that German operations in 
Canadian waters were on a larger 
scale than had been previously 
known. There were five U-boats who 
patrolled in the Gulf of St. Lawrence 
in the late summer and fall of 1944, 
a scale of effort that matched the 
1942 campaign. This was part of 
broader effort in Canadian and 
Newfoundland waters that during 
the period October 1943 to May 1945 
included extended patrols in coastal 
areas by more than 20 German 
submarines. During these months 
shipping traffic from Canadian 
ports, including the St. Lawrence, 
was particularly heavy to support 
the build up of troops, equipment 
and supplies in Great Britain for 
the Allied invasion of France at 
HMCS Magog under tow after the frigate was hit by a torpedo from U-1223 on 14 
October 1944. The explosion demolished the 20-metre-long after section of the hull. 
Note the buckled remnants of the upper deck of the stern part of the ship, folded over 
top of the surviving superstructure.
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Normandy on 6 June 1944, and then 
to sustain the advance by the Allied 
forces into Germany. Yet, in contrast 
to 1942, the U-boats sank or damaged 
only three ships in the St. Lawrence. 
The discovery about the importance 
of ”Otter” signals in the gulf – to keep 
aircraft on constant patrol over top 
of the probable positions of U-boats 
revealed as we now suspected by 
Ultra intelligence – provided a clue 
about how the Canadian forces held 
the submarines at bay. 
Alec asked me in 1983 to work 
up drafts for the whole of Eastern 
Air Command during the last 18 
months of the war using the Otter 
signals and the Ultra signals released 
by the British. The results were 
fascinating. During 1942, when no 
Ultra intelligence had been available, 
the Canadian forces had been blind. 
Most often the first firm intelligence 
about the arrival of a new U-boat in 
Canadian waters, or the movement of 
a boat from one zone to another was 
the sudden destruction of merchant 
ships. By contrast, starting in the fall 
of 1943, the RCAF’s new ”very long 
range” Consolidated Liberator four-
engine bombers, based at Gander, 
Newfoundland, began to overfly the 
suspected U-boat tracks when the 
submarines were still hundreds of 
miles out in the ocean, just beginning 
the approach towards Canadian 
waters. Other aircraft from other 
bases took over as the U-boat entered 
their area, the baton being passed 
from base to base. When warships 
were available, or when, as rarely 
happened, the U-boat revealed its 
exact position by attacking or making 
a radio signal, the Canadian forces 
organized joint air-sea hunts. On 
every occasion in which the U-boats 
managed to attack, it turned out that 
efforts to keep air and sea patrols over 
the tracks of the submarines had gone 
awry because of a failure in Ultra 
intelligence, or because the U-boat 
commander had not followed his 
orders and deviated far from the plot 
kept by U-boat headquarters – and 
the Allied intelligence staffs whose 
U-boat plots were by that stage in the 
war as good and in some cases better 
than the Germans’ own. 
The work in feeding the new 
intelligence research and analysis 
into the Eastern Air Command 
chapters of the official history of the 
RCAF in 1983-5 was particularly 
exciting because it figured directly 
in the ”renaissance” of Canadian 
naval history. I now had a partner in 
the project, Marc Milner. Marc hails 
from Sackville, New Brunswick, 
and I knew we had a true maritimer 
on staff when he came in late one 
morning and announced ”Bin to the 
dentist. He cleaned my teeth – and 
my wallet.” I’m told Marc and I have 
certain maritime traits in common: 
barrel chest and a constitutional 
inability to keep a shirt tucked in, a 
lot of hand gestures while talking, fly 
away hair (still the case with Marc, 
but mine has mostly departed during 
the intervening decades), and a way 
of slurring words that isn’t quite 
the most beautiful Queen’s English. 
Alec not infrequently got us mixed 
up, I think at one point to referring 
to Roger Milner, but I can’t swear to 
that. Marc had recently completed 
his PhD thesis, the first account of 
the Royal Canadian Navy in the 
Battle of the Atlantic that drew on 
the full archives opened in the 1970s 
in Canada, Britain and the United 
States. That was the basis of his first 
book, North Atlantic Run: The Royal 
Canadian Navy and the Battle for the 
Convoys, 1939-43, published in 1985. 
Alec, Marc and I all were in 
regular touch with Michael Hadley, 
a professor of German literature 
at the University of Victoria and a 
captain in the naval reserve. Michael, 
in the early 1980s, combined his 
interests in a study of the U-boats 
that operated in Canadian waters 
during the war. He was in contact 
with several of the surviving U-boat 
commanders, and shared stories with 
us of his encounters with the German 
veterans, together with copies of the 
wartime documents they provided 
him. Michael’s U-Boats against Canada 
appeared in 1985, at the same time as 
Marc’s book. They did a combined 
book-launch tour, but I think Marc 
was on his own in his native New 
Brunswick where he was the guest 
on a phone-in radio talk show. This 
should have been a moment of glory 
for a down-homer who had done 
good in Upper Canada – with the 
University of Toronto Press, no less. 
This is Marc’s account, as well as I 
can recall it after 24 years. Caller: ”So 
you live up there in Ottawa now?” 
Marc: ”Yes.” Caller: ”So you know a 
lot of big people up there?” Marc: ”I, 
er...” Caller: ”Well I want you to give 
a message to that Brian Mulroney...” 
In 1986, the year after Marc 
Milner’s and Michael Hadley’s books 
were published, Alec Douglas’s The 
Creation of a National Air Force: The 
Official History of the Royal Canadian 
Air Force Volume II came out. It is 
a hefty tome of 797 pages. About a 
quarter of the book, six chapters, tell 
the story of Eastern Air Command. 
The Gulf of St. Lawrence campaign of 
1942 had been elevated to a chapter 
of its own, and the operations in 
1944 got part of another chapter. It 
was these chapters, informed by the 
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work of Hadley, Milner, Rohwer and 
others, that provided the first account 
of the battle of the St. Lawrence to be 
built from the full range of archival 
records. The maritime chapters in 
the air force history, as intended, 
subsequently became the basis for 
the fuller account in the new official 
history of the navy, which got under 
way in 1987. In an uncanny repetition 
of history, deep cuts in the defence 
budget stalled the naval project 
during the last half of the 1990s, and 
delayed publication of the Second 
World War volumes until 2002 
and 2007.15 The chapters on the St. 
Lawrence in those tomes reflect 
considerable additional research, 
and raised issues for further work. 
Still, when I sat down in 2008 to 
begin War in the St. Lawrence, and 
dug through the boxes of files and 
note cards accumulated in fits and 
starts over nearly three decades, I 
realized that it was the experience at 
the directorate in the early eighties 
that laid the foundation and provided 
the inspiration for the new book. 
Time and again I felt once more the 
excitement of discovery of that early 
research. One of the main objectives 
in writing the new book was to try to 
capture that excitement. 
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